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JACK WEINSTEIN: JUDICIAL STRATEGIST
Jeffrey B. Morris*
Fifty years ago, one of the great students of the judicial process,
Walter F. Murphy,1 heir to Princeton University’s great tradition of
such scholars,2 employed the papers of United States Supreme Court
Justices to consider how any one of their number might go about ex-
erting influence within and outside the Court.  How, Murphy asked,
could a justice most efficiently use her resources—official and per-
sonal—to achieve a set of policy objectives?3  Murphy argued that
there were strategic and tactical courses open for justices to increase
their policy influence,4 and that a policy-oriented justice must be pre-
pared to consider the relative costs and benefits that might result from
her formal decisions and informal efforts at influence.5
There were, Murphy argued, a wide variety of means by which a
justice could express her preferences beyond merely voting and writ-
ing opinions.6  A justice’s strongest weapon is her vote and her signa-
ture on an opinion, but there are other means besides those available
to her, including lobbying and bargaining with her colleagues.7  To en-
hance her influence on an issue, a justice could use intellectual persua-
sion on the merits of an issue or appeal to a colleague’s loyalty to the
Court, the norm against separate opinions, or, in unusual cases, appeal
to the nation’s security.8  She could bargain over an opinion’s theory
* Professor of Law, Touro Law Center.
1. Walter Murphy lived from 1929 to 2010.  He was the author of WALTER F. MURPHY, CON-
STITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: CREATING AND MAINTAINING A JUST POLITICAL ORDER (2007);
WALTER F. MURPHY, CHARLES HERMAN PRITCHETT & LEE EPSTEIN, COURTS, JUDGES, AND
POLITICS (2005); WALTER F. MURPHY, JOSEPH TANENHAUS & DANIEL L. KASTNER, PUBLIC
EVALUATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS, ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS (1973); WALTER F.
MURPHY & JOSEPH TANENHAUS, THE STUDY OF PUBLIC LAW (1972); and WALTER F. MURPHY,
CONGRESS AND THE COURT (1962).
2. As Princeton’s McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence, he was the successor of Woodrow
Wilson, Edward Corwin, and Alpheus T. Mason.
3. WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 3–4 (1964).
4. Id. at 5.
5. Id. at 35.
6. Id. at 199.
7. Id. at 57, 199.
8. Id. at 48–49.  Murphy had in mind the Second World War Nazi saboteur case Ex parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
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or over particular language in the opinion.9  She could accede to the
majority in cases where she did not have the votes, or make conces-
sions on unimportant issues.10  She could threaten to dissent or to
write a dissenting opinion, or even circulate such an opinion.11  She
could try to form a minority group of justices into a voting bloc, at
least for purposes of one set of issues.12  Further, a justice’s influence
is likely to be higher if her relationships with others had been marked
with warmth.13  Murphy calls this phenomenon “esteem.”14
Murphy’s theories were applicable to other appellate judges or ap-
pellate courts, but on first reading, it would seem that little would be
applicable to the federal district courts.  District judges sit alone ex-
cept in the increasingly rare cases when a three-judge court is con-
vened15 or when, more often, a district judge is sitting by designation
on a court of appeals.
This is the second of two essays considering the career of Judge Jack
B. Weinstein of the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York.  In the first, forthcoming in the University of Miami
Law Review,16 I argue that Judge Weinstein, possibly uniquely for a
district judge, has acted as a judicial entrepreneur, “selling” his views
on the use of class actions to deal with mass torts.  It is the aim of this
Article to consider how Judge Weinstein, consciously and uncon-
sciously, has employed several of the tactics Walter Murphy described,
to attain influence for his opinions and other ideas.
I. A DISTRICT JUDGE’S CAPACITY FOR INFLUENCE
Federal district judges are hampered in wielding considerable influ-
ence on the law, with the exception of the impact they might have on
the parties and attorneys before them in a particular case, or when
they are handling structural lawsuits or class actions.17  District judges
are not able to initiate litigation.18  They are generally closely limited
9. MURPHY, supra note 3, at 63–68.
10. Id. at 53.
11. Id. at 56–68.
12. Id. at 78–82.
13. Id. at 49–54.
14. Id. at 91–92, 147–50.
15. 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (2012).
16. Jeffrey B. Morris, Jack B. Weinstein: Judicial Entrepreneur, 69 U. MIAMI. L. REV. 393
(forthcoming Winter 2015).
17. See, e.g., In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff’d,
818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987).
18. But see Ligon v. City of New York, 538 Fed. Appx. 101, 103 (2d Cir. 2013) (assigning a
different district judge on remand because the “impartiality surrounding this litigation was com-
promised by the District Judge’s improper application of the Court’s ‘related case rule’ . . . and
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to the issues litigants before them raise in their papers,19 as well as by
what the parties can afford to spend on the litigation.20  They may also
be limited by the capacity of the court to devise practical remedies21
and the fact that their decisions ordinarily only bind the parties to the
case or government officials and their successors in office.
The attention a district judge can give to a case is also limited by the
pressures of the rest of her docket, her interest in the case, and her
expertise in its area of law.  Finally, district court judges are limited
because their decisions bind only the parties before them and any
cases that later come before them raising the same issue.22  Further,
their decisions are subject to review by the court of appeals23 and, less
often, by the United States Supreme Court.  The court of appeals may
reverse24 or remand, thereby limiting the trial judge’s discretion, or
even send the case back so a different judge is assigned to it.25  While
interlocutory appeals are disfavored, they do occur, and the court of
appeals may also occasionally greatly limit the way a district judge is
handling a case by issuing a writ of mandamus.26
Outside the courthouse, a trial judge’s decisions are subject to criti-
cism in the political arena27 and may, in unusual cases, be stymied by
public opinion.  The judgment or decree in a case may also be subject
to the inertia of a government bureaucracy.28  It is rare, though, that a
decision of a district judge arouses sufficient concern in Congress that
legislation is passed to overturn or evade it, although Congress did
pass several laws to impede the handling of a class action brought
by a series of media interviews and public statements purporting to respond publicly to criticism
of the District Court”).
19. But see Snell v. Suffolk Cnty., 611 F. Supp. 521 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d, 782 F.2d 1094, 1102
(2d Cir. 1986) (affirming Judge Weinstein’s holding that the plaintiff experienced an “atmos-
phere of racial harassment,” despite the plaintiff’s failure to allege the requisite cause of action
in his complaint).
20. Jack W. Weinstein & Jeffrey B. Morris, Oral History of Judge Jack B.Weinstein 1842–43
(1993–2011) [hereinafter Weinstein Oral History].  Pagination is to the copy of the Oral History
owned by the author of this article.  A second copy, differently paginated, is at the Columbia
University Office of Oral History.
21. See, e.g., Hart v. Cmty. School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff’d, Hart v. Cmty.
Sch. Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975).
22. Again, structural litigation and class actions are exceptions.
23. In some situations, interlocutory appeals are possible. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012).
24. See, e.g., In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992).
25. See, e.g., Ligon v. City of New York, 538 Fed. Appx. 101 (2d Cir. 2013).
26. See, e.g., Debruyne v. Nat’l Semiconductor Corp., 35 F.3d 640 (2d Cir. 1994); In re Repeti-
tive Stress Injury Litig., 11 F.3d 368 (2d Cir. 1993).
27. See, for example, the criticism of a criminal sentence entered by Judge Weinstein by then-
Representative (later Mayor) Ed Koch. JEFFREY B. MORRIS, LEADERSHIP ON THE FEDERAL
BENCH: THE CRAFT AND ACTIVISM OF JACK WEINSTEIN 141 (2011).
28. See id. at 142; see also Weinstein Oral History, supra note 20, at 115, 493.
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against stores selling guns over which Judge Weinstein was
presiding.29
Why then attempt to apply Professor Murphy’s model to a district
judge?  The purpose is to test the proposition that district court
judges, like justices, have goals, which they may seek to realize in ways
that go beyond judgments and written opinions.  Judge Jack B. Wein-
stein has been selected because he fits so well Murphy’s description of
a policy-oriented judge—a judge who is aware of the impact decisions
can have on public policy and utilizes the leeway his office permits
(and sometimes beyond that) to “push the envelope” with his auda-
cious use of procedure, penchant for innovation, and creativity in
shaping the law.30
II. JUDGE JACK B. WEINSTEIN
A. Judge Weinstein’s Career
Born into a warm, loving, and supportive Jewish family, after living
temporarily in Kansas, Jack Weinstein grew up in Brooklyn and at-
tended Brooklyn College.  After serving as a submarine officer during
the Second World War, Judge Weinstein attended and graduated from
Columbia Law School.  In the less than two decades between his grad-
uation and appointment to the bench, Judge Weinstein engaged in the
private practice of law, clerked for distinguished New York Court of
Appeals Judge Stanley Fuld, joined the faculty of Columbia Law
School, where he would teach fulltime for over four decades, worked
with Thurgood Marshall’s team of attorneys on the brief for Brown v.
Board of Education31 and with others on reapportionment litigation,
and served as an aide to Republican State Senator Seymour Halpern
and as County Attorney of Nassau County in a Democratic
administration.
During this period, Judge Weinstein was the central figure in the
revision of the New York  Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR),32
and coauthored a seven-volume treatise on New York State practice33
and a manual of New York civil procedure.34  He also edited a
casebook on civil procedure35 and updated a casebook on evidence.36
In this period between law school graduation and appointment to the
29. See, e.g., City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 524 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2008).
30. Cf. MURPHY, supra note 3, at 3–5.
31. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
32. N.Y. C.P.L.R. (McKinney 1962).
33. JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL., NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE (1963).
34. JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL., MANUAL: CPLR (1967).
35. MAURICE ROSENBERG & JACK B. WEINSTEIN, ELEMENTS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (1962).
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bench, Judge Weinstein also wrote a number of other books, as well as
over three dozen law review articles, on such varied subjects as con-
flict of laws, hearsay, pretrial discovery, and legal assistance for the
indigent.  Thus, at the time of his appointment to the bench in 1967,
Judge Weinstein had an unusually impressive record in teaching,
scholarship, private practice (including pro bono work), and as a gov-
ernment lawyer, which provided him mastery of a number of fields of
law.  He also possessed experience in drafting legislation.  Judge
Weinstein brought to the bench an outstanding legal mind, self-confi-
dence, virtually superhuman energy, intellectual curiosity, felicity with
the written word, and the gift of deriving great pleasure from
whatever he was doing.37
As a judge, Jack Weinstein has made important jurisprudential con-
tributions to virtually all fields of federal law.  He is very well-known
for the brilliance and thoroughness of his opinions, his openness to
innovation, his deep knowledge of both substantive and procedural
law, his command of his courtroom, his ability to sustain extraordina-
rily high productivity, his capacity to shape and sometimes transform
cases, his fierce independence, and for many contributions to a strik-
ing range of extrajudicial activities.
While Judge Weinstein is probably best known in two areas to be
discussed later in this Essay—sentencing and class actions—in over
forty-seven years as a full-time judge, he has handled too many impor-
tant cases to list.  They include a number involving New York City
schools (including the unusually successful school desegregation case
Hart v. Community School Board),38 a highly politicized environmen-
tal case involving the closing of the Shoreham Nuclear Reactor,39 and
a suit involving New York City’s Administration for Children’s Ser-
vices’ (ACS) policy of immediately taking children away from bat-
tered mothers.40
Judge Weinstein has been a profound and effective friend to the
First Amendment,41 tried notable prosecutions of Mafia leaders—in-
36. EDMUND M. MORGAN, JOHN M. MAGUIRE & JACK B. WEINSTEIN, CASES AND MATERI-
ALS ON EVIDENCE (4th ed. 1957).
37. See MORRIS, supra note 27, at 71–72; see also id. passim.
38. 383 F. Supp. 699 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff’d, Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d 37 (2d
Cir. 1975); see also MORRIS, supra note 27, at 145–52, 168–74.
39. Cnty. of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 710 F. Supp. 1428 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
40. Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), questions certified sub nom.
Nicholson v. Scopetta, 344 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2003), certified questions answered, 820 N.E.2d 840
(N.Y. 2004), vacated and remanded, 116 Fed. Appx. 313 (2d Cir. 2004).
41. See, e.g., U.S. Labor Party v. Codd, 391 F. Supp. 920 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Birnbaum v. United
States, 436 F. Supp. 967 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 588 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1978);
N. Shore Right to Life Comm. v. Manhasset Am. Legion Post No. 304, 452 F. Supp. 834
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cluding those of Anthony Colombo,42 Joey Gallo,43 and Vincent
“Chin” Gigante44—and made important contributions with opinions
in such areas as jurisdiction,45 Social Security disability,46 and “mega”-
criminal cases.47  One of Judge Weinstein’s most extraordinary
achievements was clearing a high percentage of the backlog of habeas
corpus petitions of the Eastern District by volunteering at the age of
eighty-two to take the cases from his colleagues’ dockets.  He handled
500 of the District Court’s close to 800 cases.48
If the foregoing describes some of the contributions of Judge Wein-
stein on the bench, it does not take account of his contributions
outside the courtroom, including two books—one on rule making,49
the other on mass tort class actions50—and several hundred law re-
view articles on a great variety of subjects with the greatest impact in
the areas of evidence and mass torts.
Judge Weinstein was a major figure in the drafting of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. When the preliminary draft of the Rules of Evi-
dence was published and the final rules approved, he made a series of
speeches preparing the way for their acceptance.51  After that, with his
former law clerk Margaret Berger (who became a professor at Brook-
lyn Law School), he produced a seven-volume treatise on evidence.52
Together with Berger, he updated the treatise several times and pro-
duced annual supplements.53  During his first decade on the bench,
(E.D.N.Y. 1978); Troyer v. Town of Babylon, 483 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 628 F.2d 1346
(2d Cir.), aff’d sub nom. Town of Southampton v. Troyer, 449 U.S. 988 (1980) (unpublished table
decision); Greenberg v. Bolger, 497 F. Supp. 756 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). But see Gordon v. Griffith, 88
F. Supp. 2d 38 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that a legislator did not violate a political aide’s First
Amendment rights when the legislator terminated the aide for public comments she made in the
legislator’s district).
42. United States v. Colombo, 616 F. Supp. 780 (E.D.N.Y.), rev’d, 777 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1985).
43. United States v. Gallo, 671 F. Supp. 124 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
44. United States v. Gigante, 982 F. Supp. 140 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
45. Bulova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., 508 F. Supp. 1322 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
46. City of New York v. Heckler, 578 F. Supp. 1109 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
47. United States v. Mosquera, 813 F. Supp. 962 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); see also United States v.
Mosquera, 816 F. Supp. 168 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
48. In re Habeas Corpus Cases, 298 F. Supp. 2d 303 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (memorandum report on
the disposition of 500 habeas corpus cases), aff’d in part sub nom. Murden v. Artuz, 497 F.3d 178
(2d Cir. 2007); see also William Glaberson, Unbelievable Stories (Just Ask the Judge), N.Y.
TIMES, July 30, 2003, at B1.
49. JACK B. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES (1977).
50. JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE EFFECT OF
CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES (1995).
51. MORRIS, supra note 27, at 104.
52. JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE (1975) (published
in seven volumes from 1975 to 1979 with annual supplements).
53. Judge Weinstein also undertook a major updating of Edward R. Morgan’s Basic Problems
of State and Federal Evidence for its fifth edition (1976), and with John M. Maguire, James H.
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Judge Weinstein wrote a number of law review articles, which were
mini treatises on various evidentiary problems.54
Judge Weinstein has had a hard-to-define impact as a role model
who emboldens younger, less experienced judges,55 has won the admi-
ration of many law professors, and has become an icon for public-
interest attorneys.
Judge Weinstein’s achievements have certainly been recognized.  In
2003, he received the federal judiciary’s highest award, the Edward J.
Devitt Award.56  He has received seven honorary degrees, including
those of Columbia and Yale.  In 1993, the National Law Journal
named him “Lawyer of the Year.”57  The Columbia Law Review
honored him with a special issue.58  Three other law schools—Brook-
lyn, the University of Miami, and now DePaul—have held symposia in
his honor.
B. Some Reasons for Judge Weinstein’s Influence
One should begin at the beginning: Judge Weinstein has a brilliant
mind, and his brilliance is not limited to the law.  His intellectual curi-
osity continues to be enormous at the age of ninety-three.  His mind is
quick and creative, with the capacity to absorb large quantities of ma-
terial.  He is an omnivorous reader and a quick study—a great advan-
tage for overcoming the difficulty trial judges face in dealing with the
wide range of problems that come before them.  In particular, he has a
remarkable grasp of science, mathematics, and philosophy.59
His legal mind is extraordinary.  He seems to have mastered every
field of law he has encountered.  He can see connections between ap-
parently disparate matters that others miss and, as Dean Martha Mi-
now of Harvard Law School has written, is able “to explore innovative
substantive norms.”60  He has the capacity to take a very ordinary case
and make it very important; he has the analytical vision to recast mun-
dane issues brought to him by lawyers into important issues that
Chadbourn, and John H. Mansfield, edited the sixth edition (1973) of Cases and Materials on
Evidence.
54. See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Basic Rules of Relevancy in the Pro-
posed Federal Rules of Evidence, 4 GA. L. REV. 43 (1969).
55. See Symposium, Judge Jack B. Weinstein, Tort Litigation, and the Public Good: A Round-
table Discussion To Honor One of America’s Great Trial Judges on the Occasion of His 80th
Birthday, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 149, 162 (2003) [hereinafter 80th Birthday Roundtable].
56. Weinstein Receives Devitt Award, THIRD BRANCH, Feb. 1994, at 3.
57. Lawyer of the Year, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 27, 1993–Jan. 3, 1994, at S3.
58. 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1947 (1997) (“A Special Issue Dedicated to Judge Jack B. Weinstein”).
59. See MORRIS, supra note 27, at 57, 90–91.
60. Martha Minow, Judge for the Situation: Judge Jack Weinstein: Creator of Temporary Ad-
ministrative Agencies, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2010, 2018 (1997).
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somehow others did not see.  He has demonstrated the ability over
and over again to shape, develop, and transform cases before him,
greatly enlarging their importance and leading to new solutions to dif-
ficult problems.  As a judge, he takes the initiative in shaping the liti-
gation because he will have considered matters two steps ahead of
anybody else.61  Above all, Judge Weinstein has given considerable
thought to the direction the law should be headed, which makes him
ready when the right case comes along.62
Judge Weinstein’s influence has been definitely enhanced by prose
that often is either elegant or catchy, and sometimes both.  He learned
how to carefully shape the facts in his opinions from Judge Stanley
Fuld.63  Judge Fuld is also the role model for the thoroughness that
characterizes all of Judge Weinstein’s work.  As a blog posting put it:
“A briefing order that reads like a law review article can only emanate
from the chambers of [Judge] Jack B. Weinstein.”64
Finally, Judge Weinstein’s entire career has been marked by innova-
tion: in methods of managing cases, techniques used in the courtroom,
in the application of procedural rules, and in the development of the
substantive law.65
Among the Judge’s other salient characteristics are indefatigable
energy and ability to sustain extraordinarily hard work, both coupled
with lifelong good health.  It is this energy that makes Judge Wein-
stein’s extensive involvements in extrajudicial activities possible.
These activities have included teaching, writing, speaking, activity in
judicial administration, and involvement in both legal and nonlegal
organizations.  During his first few years on the bench, he continued
teaching two courses per semester at Columbia, took an active role in
drafting the Federal Rules of Evidence, completed his evidence trea-
tise, updated a casebook, and wrote twenty-eight law review articles.
At ninety-three, he still gets up in the middle of the night to tinker
with drafts of speeches or opinions, and then rises for the day before
5:30.66
61. See id.; see also, e.g., Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); David v.
Heckler, 591 F. Supp. 1033 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
62. See, e.g., Ashley v. Abbott Labs. (In re DES Cases), 789 F. Supp. 552 (E.D.N.Y. 1992),
appeal dismissed, 7 F.3d 20 (2d Cir. 1993); Hall v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 312 F. Supp.
358 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
63. Weinstein Oral History, supra note 20, at 1176.
64. JaneAnne Murray, EDNY Judge Sets Stage for Notable Decision on Restitution and Forfei-
ture, N.Y. FED. CRIM. PRAC. (Feb. 8, 2008, 4:05 PM), http/www.nyfederalcriminalpractice.com/
2008/02/edny-judge-sets-stage-for-nota.html.
65. MORRIS, supra note 27, at 105.
66. Weinstein Oral History, supra note 20, at 812, 900, 1615; see also Joan G. Wexler, In Praise
of Jack B. Weinstein, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1968, 1969 (1997).
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Accompanying these abilities are personal qualities that have added
to his impact.  He has a positive approach to life that must make his
inexhaustible flow of energy possible. Although he can be quite self-
critical, his insecurities are few and his self-confidence considerable.67
Another significant aspect of Judge Weinstein’s personality is his
fierce independence—primarily as a judge, but also in personal mat-
ters.  For Judge Weinstein, judicial independence means that judges
are placed in their offices to take risks, whether the risk is reversal by
a higher court or sharp criticism from the press or the public.  Judge
Weinstein has never been deterred by public criticism from his “judi-
cial superiors,” and has even avoided close social relations with the
judges of the court of appeals so to better maintain his indepen-
dence.68  As will be discussed at greater length later, Judge Weinstein
feels a greater need to speak out than most judges.
Finally, Judge Jack Weinstein likes to be active.  He is, in many re-
spects, a man of action.  With Judge Weinstein, it can sometimes be
difficult to distinguish between a hyperactive personality and an “ac-
tivist” judge, though there can be a difference.  One might place in the
former category Judge Weinstein’s reliance on site visits to better un-
derstand the cases before him, even if they may include crawling in-
side a nuclear reactor or visiting a federal institution almost 200 miles
away to find an alternative to prison for a young man who had been
convicted of possessing child pornography,69 or his willingness to han-
dle the habeas corpus backlog of his colleagues.70  But, there are
surely dollops of judicial activism in Judge Weinstein’s striking use of
the powers of equity71 or his decision to risk reversal in a case “be-
cause the law was wrong.”  Speaking of that case,72 Judge Weinstein
put it this way, “I was more interested in moving the law into what I
considered the more modern and useful areas of tort law.”73  Judicial
activist or not, Judge Weinstein is a man who actively shapes his envi-
ronment, rather than allowing himself to be molded by it, and who
seeks out, or even creates, opportunities for action.74
67. Weinstein Oral History, supra note 20, at 58.
68. Id. at 100–03.
69. United States v. C.R., 792 F. Supp. 2d 343, 476, app. at 521–24 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
70. In re Habeas Corpus Cases, 298 F. Supp. 2d 303 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
71. See In re Joint E & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., No. CV 93-2129, 1993 WL 604077 (E.D.N.Y. &
S.D.N.Y. July 1, 1993), rev’d, 14 F.3d 726 (2d Cir. 1993).
72. Bushey & Sons v. United States, 276 F. Supp. 518 (E.D.N.Y 1967), aff’d, 398 F2d 167 (2d
Cir. 1968).
73. Weinstein Oral History, supra note 20, at 53.
74. Cf. JAMES DAVID BARBER, THE PRESIDENTIAL CHARACTER 267 (4th ed. 1992) (writing
about Presidents such as F.D.R.); see also id. passim.
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Among Judge Weinstein’s personal traits which come to bear under
the tactic of “esteem” are great personal charm, puckish wit, and
warmth.75  It should also be noted that Judge Weinstein’s brilliant ca-
reer as a district judge is, in a sense, the result of the few setbacks he
has suffered.  Judge Weinstein was defeated in the Democratic pri-
mary for Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals in 1973, and
was bypassed for appointment to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit in the late 1970s.76  Had he been elected to
New York’s highest court, he would have to have retired at age sev-
enty, cutting off what has now been an additional twenty-three years
of his judging.  He was fortunate to not have been appointed to either
appellate court for, as an appellate judge, he would have been forced
into bargaining and modification of the language of his opinions,
which would have limited his independence.77
C. Judge Weinstein’s View of His Role as Judge
Judge Weinstein’s view of his role as a judge differs quite considera-
bly from that of most federal trial judges, and indeed from most fed-
eral judges, if one can trust the responses judges have given to
interviews.78  Employing the conception of “role” used by many politi-
cal scientists, scholars have reported that, according to interviews,
most federal judges view themselves as “law interpreters” who believe
in a modest role for courts and accept the norms of judicial restraint
and respect for precedent while looking unkindly upon innovative
decisions.79
Judge Weinstein is an unabashed “lawmaker.”  Judges who identify
themselves as lawmakers contend that they can and must make law
some of the time, because appellate court precedents are often ambig-
uous, as is the language of statutes, and legislative intent is often im-
75. The Weinstein Oral History is full of examples. See e.g., Weinstein Oral History, supra
note 20, at 59.
76. See MORRIS, supra note 27, at 155–60, 202.
77. There are two other aspects of good fortune that Judge Weinstein has had: a happy family
life and the lack of financial worries because of the success of his treatises and casebooks.
78. James L. Gibson, Judges’ Role Orientations, Attitudes, and Decisions, in COURTS, LAW,
AND JUDICIAL PROCESSES 150, 161–63 (S. Sidney Ulmer ed., 1981); see also G. ALAN TARR,
JUDICIAL PROCESS AND JUDICIAL POLICYMAKING 265–67 (4th ed. 2006); cf. Jack B. Weinstein,
The Roles of a Federal District Court Judge, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 439 (2011).
79. See ROBERT A. CARP & RONALD STIDHAM, THE FEDERAL COURTS 164 (2d ed. 1991); see
also CHARLES H. SHELDON, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL PROCESS: MODELS AND APPROACHES
85–86 (1974).
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possible to ascertain.80  Judge Weinstein, though, has an even bolder
view.  He is concerned with “moving the law,” and believes that “[t]he
concept that ‘judges don’t make law’ is a myth [equal to] recognizing
that the naked emperor is wearing clothes.”81
Furthermore, Judge Weinstein differs from most district judges in
the way he goes about decision making.  Most district judges are
“mechanists,” who view decision making as merely the process of ap-
plying correct and readily apparent answers to legal questions, or “for-
malists,” who believe that judges ought to arrive at their decisions
through well-established procedures.  Judge Weinstein finds more
gaps in the law than other judges, looks for new issues, and “has far
less compunction about departing from precedent.”82
This observer has argued that one other aspect of Judge Weinstein’s
view of his role as a judge is that he also sees the judge as an “educa-
tor.”83  The Judge once said to me, “I’ve never ignored an opportunity
of a public forum to make a little substantive statement.”84  The trea-
tises, the casebooks, the books on rule making and mass torts, the
abundant law review articles, the hundreds of speeches (many going
through a number of drafts), teaching a full professorial load while on
the bench, and, of course, the opinions themselves, bear witness to
someone who simply must educate.  Judge Weinstein used to bring his
students down to the courthouse to see cases “much as you would do
with grand rounds if you were a medical person to illuminate the
problem.”85
80. SHELDON, supra note 79, at 89; see also HENRY R. GLICK, SUPREME COURTS IN STATE
POLITICS 50 (1971); Marc Galanter et al., The Crusading Judge: Judicial Activism in Trial Courts,
52 S. CAL. L. REV. 699, 711 (1979).
81. Weinstein Oral History, supra note 20, at 312; see also Jack B. Weinstein, Speech to Law
Clerks and Student Interns of the Eastern District of New York: Making Law in Mass Torts and
Other Things 2–3 (July 16, 2009).
82. MORRIS, supra note 27, at 93–97.  Judge Weinstein does, however, share with most judges
the role of “case processor,” the goal of which is efficient management of his docket. See SHEL-
DON, supra note 79, at 90; see also GLICK, supra note 80, at 31; WILLIAM I. KITCHIN, FEDERAL
DISTRICT JUDGES: AN ANALYSIS OF ROLE PERCEPTIONS 39–41 (1978).
83. See J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 133–34
(1981).
84. Weinstein Oral History, supra note 20, at 1091–92.
85. Id. at 468.  He found one criminal case on his docket “a wonderful case from the point of
evidence teaching.”  Part of the opinion was used in the casebook, while Judge Weinstein had his
students come down to the courthouse and see part of the trial. Id. at 801–02.
Professor Stephen Burbank has argued that Judge Weinstein’s conception of the judicial role
has been greatly influenced by his career as a law professor, ascribing to that Judge Weinstein’s
desire for intellectual autonomy and his lack of regard for institutional accountability.  For Bur-
bank, Judge Weinstein’s powerful belief in judicial independence comes from a desire to give
free reign to his extraordinary intelligence and creativity, and yields behavior that is ideologi-
cally based. See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Courtroom as Classroom: Independence,
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As I have written elsewhere,86 Judge Weinstein qualifies as an “en-
trepreneurial judge.”  That is, “a judge alert to the opportunity for
innovation, willing to invest the resources and assume the risks” to
influence the adoption of a genuinely new legal concept;87 a salesman
for ideas.  When a question is presented that falls within such a judge’s
realm of special expertise and interests, it represents for her an oppor-
tunity for true intellectual engagement, something she might respond
to with considerable enthusiasm.  Such a judge has to commit a good
deal of time, have a willingness to endure criticism and reversal, take a
grand view of the law, and have the self-confidence to craft opinions
that she thinks will help nudge it in that direction.88
Judge Weinstein is, of course, the quintessential entrepreneurial
judge, although he has never limited himself to “selling” a single idea.
With his strong sense of where the law should be headed, Judge Wein-
stein has been and continues to be engaged with many ideas and inno-
vations which he has attempted to “peddle” to federal judges, United
States prosecutors and defense attorneys, law professors, the class ac-
tion bar, public interest lawyers, and law students.
We shall see that Judge Jack B. Weinstein, the inveterate and incor-
rigible educator, though formally limited to one district, has had a na-
tional impact with his jurisprudence and other contributions to the
law.
D. Judge Weinstein’s Judicial Philosophy
The core of Judge Jack B. Weinstein’s judicial philosophy is his view
that “to aid the weak and suffering delineates the primary duty of
American law.”89  Within that core, there are four principles.  First,
there is a profound need for attorneys to represent the poor and vul-
nerable.90  Second, the gate-keeping doctrines that keep the poor out
of court should be breached.91  Third, where substantive decision
making is involved, the law should be “protective of those who other-
Imagination and Ideology in the Work of Jack Weinstein, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1971 (1977).  Judge
Weinstein has said, “My problem may well be that I still haven’t decided whether I’m a professor
or a judge . . . or [an] advocate.”  Weinstein Oral History, supra note 20, at 519–20.
86. See Morris, supra note 16, at 377 (quoting WAYNE V. MCINTOSH & CYNTHIA L. CATES,
JUDICIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP: THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE IN THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS 5
(1997)).
87. MORRIS, supra note 27, at 108.
88. See MCINTOSH & CATES, supra note 86, 4–7, 12–13; see also id. passim; MORRIS, supra
note 27, at 376–77.
89. MORRIS, supra note 27, at 96–97.
90. See id. at 97.
91. See id. at 97–98.
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wise would be without power to protect themselves.”92  Fourth, “the
judge should act in a compassionate human way to show that the law
isn’t all that rigid and cruel.”93
As a judge, Judge Weinstein is aware of the burdens placed on the
court when individuals without legal training represent themselves:
“The inability of the unskilled litigant to prepare pleadings, conduct
adequate investigation, work with the rules of evidence, research deci-
sional law, or persuasively argue the case in court render fair and ex-
peditious disposition of most civil litigation virtually impossible.”94
When the Reagan Administration sought first to kill the Legal Ser-
vices Corporation, and then to cripple it, Judge Weinstein, though by
no means alone, gave a great deal of attention to the issue—opposing
the support by giving speeches, writing articles, and taking practical
steps as Chief Judge of the Eastern District.95
Previously, Judge Weinstein had done public battle with Chief Jus-
tice Warren Burger, Chief Judge Irving R. Kaufman, and others who
were arguing that the federal courts were too busy and that a variety
of lesser cases should be transferred to state courts.  Judge Weinstein
argued, “Accessibility to the courts on equal terms is essential to
equality before the law.  If we cannot provide this foundational pro-
tection through the courts, most of the rest of our promises of liberty
and justice for all remain a mockery for the poor and oppressed.”96
He also argued that
federal courts should not lightly abdicate their responsibility to pro-
vide a forum for the disposition of civil disputes presently within
their jurisdiction merely because individual claims appear small or
insignificant. Increased availability of the courts to those with griev-
ances . . . [by] modifications of such doctrines as standing, mootness,
92. Arnold H. Lubasch, Jack Weinstein: Creative U.S. Judge Who Disdains Robe and High
Bench, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1991, at B5.
93. Weinstein Oral History, supra note 20, at 1367–68.
94. MORRIS, supra note 27, at 196 (quoting Jack B. Weinstein, Speech to the New York City
Bar: All People Are Entitled to the Assistance of Lawyers in Civil as well as Criminal Matters 3
(Mar. 30, 1976)).
95. MORRIS, supra note 27, at 195 & n.209 (discussing speeches given by Judge Weinstein
including Jack B. Weinstein, Address, The Poor’s Right to Equal Access to the Courts, 13 CONN.
L. REV. 651, 657 (1981) [hereinafter Weinstein, Right to Equal Access] (printing a speech Judge
Weinstein gave at the University of Connecticut Law School on Apr. 22, 1981); Jack B. Wein-
stein, Speech at Columbia Law School Symposium, Reducing Costs of Litigation: Reforming the
Poor out of Court (Mar. 28, 1981), reprinted at N.Y. L.J., Mar. 30, 1981; Jack B. Weinstein,
Speech to the New York City Bar: The Court’s Stake in Lawyer’s Pro Bono Work 10–11 (Oct. 6,
1981); Jack B. Weinstein, Speech to the New York Law School: Justice and Mercy—Law and
Equity (Apr. 13, 1983), reprinted at 28 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 817 (1984), excerpts in NEWSDAY,
June 2, 1982 (printing portions of the same speech, Individualization of Justice, given as a com-
mencement address at the University of Connecticut Law School, May 21, 1983)).
96. Weinstein, Right to Equal Access, supra note 95, at 651, 655.
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abstention and justiciability, have provided a valuable escape valve,
preventing explosive reactions during a period of boiling social
change.97
Where substantive decision making was involved, Judge Weinstein
has said, “It is appropriate for a judge to ask, ‘Does my decision nec-
essarily widen the gap between rich and poor, advantaged and disad-
vantaged?”98  At the age of eighty, he said this: “That’s in my
background.  I can’t escape it.  What it leads to always in every one of
the cases is the question: what can I do for the individual—the person,
who is suffering, or may not be suffering, but thinks he or she is
suffering?”99
Finally, Judge Weinstein is not only concerned that the courts offer
succor to the poor and vulnerable as a group.  He believes that anyone
in the courts ought to be treated as an individual.  Perhaps the most
salient characteristic of “Weinstein-the-Judge” is his stress on the
“human face of the law.”  For Judge Weinstein, this means that the
judge should, in a compassionate human way, show that the law is not
all that rigid and cruel.100  The judge should have the ability to put
himself in the shoes of those before him.  In court, the parties ought to
have a feeling that the judge “has listened to me”;101 the defendant
should feel that she has been fairly treated, and that she has been
heard.  In sentencing, it means that “the individual who sentences
must consider compassion to those being sentenced as well as their
family members,”102 and it means that the judge’s body language and
visage must convey the message: “I respect you as a human being.”103
In mass tort cases, it means avoiding the “rigidity of matrixes that
treat people, not as if they were individuals [and] human beings,”104
and “giv[ing] each individual who is hurt a sense that, yes, somebody
has heard me, . . . somebody cares about me.”105
97. Jack B. Weinstein, Some Reflections on the “Abusiveness” of Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 299,
300 (1973) (“Excerpts from a Symposium before the Judicial Conference of the Fifth Circuit
Judicial Circuit”).
98. Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a Government of, by and for the People: Notes for
the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 33 (2008).
99. Eightieth Birthday Roundtable, supra note 55, at 149, 172.
100. Weinstein Oral History, supra note 20, at 1367–68.
101. WEINSTEIN, supra note 50, at 167.
102. Id. at 179.
103. Id. at 227; see also id. at 223–24.
104. Eightieth Birthday Roundtable, supra note 55, at 172.
105. MORRIS, supra note 27, at 98.
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III. THE WEAPONS OF A DISTRICT JUDGE
Having considered Judge Jack Weinstein’s view of his role and judi-
cial philosophy, it is necessary to consider the weapons he might use
to reach his goals.  I briefly preface that topic with a discussion of the
weapons available to district judges in general.
A district judge works with both the tangible powers and the intan-
gible prestige and legitimacy of her office.  She is clothed with the cult
of the robe—the widely shared view of the public that a judge is a
kind of high priest of justice with special talents for elucidating “the
law”—a kind of institutional charisma.106  Ironically, Judge Weinstein
works against this, in a way, by often meeting with attorneys in his
cases without a robe and sitting down at a table with them rather than
appearing on a raised platform.
While Judge Weinstein admits to being a “lawmaker,” he too bene-
fits from the charisma and mystery that American judges—inheritors
of the mantle of Chief Justice John Marshall—possess.  Such charisma
is nourished by the acceptance of the notion that judges find the law.
Further, while elected officials often bristle about “judicial activists,”
they are aware that they too benefit from judicial power.  Judges not
only have the power to strike down the actions of elected officials and
bureaucrats, but they also possess the legitimizing authority necessary
for the acts of those in public office.107
While most Americans rarely give a thought to district courts,
judges of that tier profit from the diffuse support the public gives the
Supreme Court.  Further, district judges do have certain instruments
of power, some of which may be more important unused but known.
These powers include the power to issue injunctions and writs of man-
damus, to fashion decrees, to issue declaratory judgments, and to pun-
ish contempt.108
When dealing with the attorneys before them, trial judges possess
particularly strong powers.  Not the least of these is aggressive case
management, through which a judge can force lawyers to trial before
they believe they will be ready.  The federal judge’s power is amplified
by the fact that she has life tenure.  Not only is the removal of a judge
from a case a rare happening, but attorneys cannot but be aware that
they may be practicing before the same judge for perhaps another
thirty years.
106. MURPHY, supra note 3, at 13.
107. Id. at 16–19.
108. Id. at 18–19.
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Nevertheless, district judges cannot roam too freely.  They are lim-
ited by Article III of the United States Constitution, appellate prece-
dent, gate-keeping doctrines, and, of course, the fact that they cannot
act if there is no case before them.  They are limited by the kind of
remedies they can order.  Their nonconstitutional decisions can be
overturned by the passage of a law by Congress, and they are subject
to the pace of compliance by political officeholders and the govern-
ment bureaucracy.  Then, too, the court of appeals and the Supreme
Court loom above.
In Elements of Judicial Strategy, Walter Murphy suggests the tactics
available to a justice when she is trying to persuade a colleague on the
merits of a policy choice.109  They include efforts to capitalize on per-
sonal regard, to bargain, to threaten and, if possible, to have a voice in
the selection of new personnel.110  Murphy also indicates that when
dealing with lower court judges, the Supreme Court also has the
power to command.  As we turn now to consider the manner in which
three of the weapons Murphy discusses—command, persuasion, and
esteem—have been employed by Judge Weinstein, one must remem-
ber that many of the ways any person enhances his influence on some-
one else come from unconscious manifestations of personality.  A
compliment on an opinion or a Christmas greeting may, in the mind of
the actor, have nothing at all to do with deliberate efforts to convince
someone of the rightness of his or her position in a given case or cases.
The same can be said for an uncalculated expression of interest in, or
concern for, someone else.  They may, however, have the effect, over
time, of making the respondent more susceptible to influence.
IV. JUDGE WEINSTEIN’S USE OF TACTICS DESCRIBED BY MURPHY
The generalized prestige of a federal judge is reinforced when he
has won professional respect for his abilities.111  In Judge Jack Wein-
stein’s case, while he has often been reversed by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, he is nevertheless an ac-
knowledged titan in many fields of law, especially in two fields essen-
tial to trial work—evidence and procedure.  Given that reputation and
that for being extremely well-prepared at conferences and at trial—
attorneys may well anticipate that he may push them to try a very
different case than they expected to try and that the impact of the case
may be greatly enlarged.
109. Id. at 43.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 19.
2015] JACK WEINSTEIN: JUDICIAL STRATEGIST 295
A. Command
When dealing with attorneys prior to trial and in the courtroom, the
trial judge has close to absolute power in dealing with such issues as
the scheduling of dates and scope of discovery, as well as the granting
of continuances.  In such matters, the actions of district judges are es-
sentially immune from external scrutiny.  In the Eastern District, how-
ever, such decisions are usually made by the magistrate judge, even if
an Article III judge is likely to try the case.112  This does not, however,
mean that the trial judge plays no substantive role during the pretrial
phase in the Eastern District, only that the areas of command are
limited.
Much more than most district judges, Judge Weinstein takes the ini-
tiative in shaping a lawsuit.  Because of his ability to make connec-
tions between what seem to be disparate aspects of a case, the Judge
has the capacity to transform cases by putting ingenious strategies into
the minds of attorneys appearing before him.  In doing so, sometimes
he narrows the scope of the issues, and sometimes he widens them.
Judge Weinstein may also increase the visibility and significance of the
dispute by asking the United States to intervene, as well as by ap-
pointing or inviting the participation of amicus curiae.  He aims for
the involvement of a broad array of parties named in a suit because he
believes that doing so produces good substantive outcomes, as well as
a public dialogue that can strengthen the legitimacy of judicial deci-
sion making.113
When dealing with attorneys in the courtroom, a good trial judge
must act decisively when she rules on motions, and command when
necessary to keep order.  Judge Weinstein has several techniques to
prevent or limit interlocutory appeals in class actions.  He provides
attorneys with “tentative opinions,” which cannot be appealed, but
provide the attorneys with the drift of his views.  He also is stingy in
granting certificates of appealability.  Finally, as Professor Burt
Neuborne of New York University School of Law, who has practiced
before Judge Weinstein, has said, Judge Weinstein “imposes [on attor-
neys] the obligation of sitting down around a table and seeing if a
solution can be resolved.”114
112. See generally Christopher E. Smith, From U.S. Magistrate to U.S. Magistrate Judge: De-
velopments Affecting the Federal District Courts’ Lower Tier of Judicial Officers, 75 JUDICATURE
210, 214 (1992).
113. See Minow, supra note 60, at 2012, 2018; see also MORRIS, supra note 27, at 6.
114. Eightieth Birthday Roundtable, supra note 55, at 186.
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B. Persuasion in Jurisprudential Matters
Focusing on the Supreme Court, Walter Murphy looked at how a
policy-oriented justice might go about winning the votes of colleagues
for her position.  He began with the most traditional tactic—a memo-
randum massing precedent and history.  But Murphy argued that
there were other ways to persuade.  A justice might suggest a particu-
lar need for unanimity in a case because of its sensitivity, the signifi-
cance of the decision, or because of potential ramifications that might
harm the Court.  Both the persuading justice and the target of the
persuasion might also be aware that the tactics being used in one case
might affect the future meaningful exchange of views.  Concessions by
the author of the opinion on minor points, for example, might place a
justice in a better position to win reluctant votes from colleagues on
other matters.115
Generally, the individual district judge does not need to persuade
her colleagues in the district, but may well be interested in persuading
other audiences.  The major tool for this, of course, is the opinion.
Professor Lawrence Baum, a distinguished political scientist at the
Ohio State University, has suggested that judicial opinions are aimed
at audiences that are important to the judge.116  While most published
opinions are aimed at attorneys and other judges, there are also other
possible audiences, including legal academics, those in other branches
of government, policy groups and the news media, as well as the fami-
lies, friends, and acquaintances of the judge.117
Judge Jack B. Weinstein writes a great number of opinions.  The
“Weinstein Opinion” is formidable—long, utterly thorough, and
graced with literary felicity.118  Often, the opinion may be preceded by
a table of contents and followed by appendices.119  This can be “Wein-
stein-the-Educator” in full bloom.
Judge Weinstein aims his opinions at different audiences.  Some are
written just for the parties and their attorneys; most of these are not
published.  Opinions that are essentially findings of fact—something a
district judge must do—are written to illuminate the case or to per-
suade the court of appeals.  Sometimes, Judge Weinstein writes with
the court of appeals in mind, but for a different reason.  Such a case
115. MURPHY, supra note 3, at 43–54.
116. LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL BE-
HAVIOR 4 (2006).
117. Id. at 21; see also id. passim.
118. Judge Weinstein’s opinions do not have footnotes (unlike his heavily footnoted law re-
view articles).  Citations are placed in the text.
119. MORRIS, supra note 27, at 91.
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was Manufacturas International Ltda v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust
Co.120  That was a forfeiture case involving issues raised by the Fed-
eral Reserve and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Acts, but which
also included a cause of action for conversion, a third-party benefici-
ary issue, negligence claims, and more.121  Judge Weinstein said he
wrote the long opinion because “[he] lacked confidence in the Court
of Appeals’ understanding the technical details and [he] didn’t want to
get reversed on it and have to try it again.”122
There have also been times, usually when Judge Weinstein has been
reversed by the court of appeals, when he has written an opinion re-
sponding to the reversal and making clear his differences with the ap-
pellate court.  Such opinions are not so much aimed at the court of
appeals, but rather are his attempt to create, at the district court level,
the equivalent of an appellate dissent aimed at the future.123
Sometimes, Judge Weinstein writes an opinion with the general
public in mind.  One such instance involved the closing of the Shore-
ham Nuclear Reactor after a prolonged and bitter public dispute.  He
used the opinion approving the $400 million class action settlement to
explain the controversy and the settlement.124
While Judge Weinstein does not send his opinions to other judges,
on some occasions he delves deeply into a case in order to provide
illumination for judges and magistrates facing the same or similar is-
sues.  One such opinion dealt with discovery of the records of police
officers sued for violations of civil rights and whether state law or fed-
eral law governed in § 1983 cases.125  In order to bring consistency to
the rulings of magistrates in the district, Judge Weinstein set out a
procedure for all magistrates to follow.126  At trial, Judge Weinstein
made another consequential ruling—whether it was appropriate
120. 792 F. Supp. 180 (E.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37
(2d Cir. 1993).  For what happened on remand, see Organizacion JD Ltda. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, No. CV-92-3690, 1996 WL 162271 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 1996), aff’d, 124 F.3d 354 (2d Cir.
1997).
121. Manufacturas Int’l Ltda, 792 F. Supp. at 183–87.
122. Weinstein Oral History, supra note 20, at 1163–64.
123. See Judge Weinstein’s discussion of this in an unpublished oral history interview (video
taping) with Gordon Mehler.  Interivew by Gordon Mehler with Jack B. Weinstein, for the Fed-
eral Bar Council (Oct. 10, 2006) (video copy in possession of the author).
124. Cnty. of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 710 F. Supp. 1428 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); see also
MORRIS, supra note 27, at 239.
125. Id. at 186–88.
126. Id. at 189–92.
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under the Federal Rules of Evidence to admit part of a report of the
State Investigation Commission on police abuse in Suffolk County.127
Finally, Judge Weinstein has written opinions aimed at courts far
beyond the Eastern District with the idea of “moving the law.”128
One such opinion occurred in a case involving New York City’s Ad-
ministration for Children’s Services’.129  At issue was ACS’ policy of
automatically taking children from their mother and placing them in
foster care when the mother was the victim of battering.130
Nicholson sued, seeking a class action, which Judge Weinstein certi-
fied.131  Judge Weinstein raised the visibility of the case by asking the
Juvenile Rights Division of the Legal Aid Society to act as a friend of
the court, and other amici were attracted from all across the country.
The evidence indicated that ACS’s practice resulted from benign in-
difference, bureaucratic inefficiency, and outmoded institutional bi-
ases.  Ultimately, the litigation was dealt with both by the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit132 and the New York Court of Ap-
peals.133  As a result of the litigation, New York City completely reor-
ganized the handling of this class of cases.134  The effects of the
litigation were felt throughout the nation.
C. Persuasion: Treatises and Casebooks
It is difficult to connect Judge Weinstein’s treatises,135 casebooks,136
and supplements to particular jurisprudential results in his cases.  This
work deepened his knowledge of the areas, and familiarized him with
127. Gentile v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 129 F.R.D. 435 (E.D.N.Y. 1990); see also Weinstein Oral
History, supra note 20, at 900–04.
128. Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), questions certified sub nom.
Nicholson v. Scopetta, 344 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2003), certified questions answered by 820 N.E.2d
840 (N.Y. 2004), vacated and remanded by 116 Fed. Appx. 313 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Hall v. E.I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).  Judge Weinstein has also written
opinions aimed at middle-level governmental officials, such as managers and educators.  Wein-
stein Oral History, supra note 20, at 888.  Among other opinions are those written for teaching
purposes or for the casebook.  Weinstein Oral History, supra note 20, at 888, 1234. United States
v. Barbati, 284 F. Supp. 409 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), was a hearsay opinion that Judge Weinstein admit-
ted was for the former purpose, Weinstein Oral History, supra note 20, at 87, and United States v.
Hing Shair Chan, 680 F. Supp. 521 (E.D.N.Y. 1988), on the admission of contemporaneous docu-
ments, was intended for the latter process, although ultimately vetoed by co-editor Margaret
Berger.  Weinstein Oral History, supra note 20, at 888.
129. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 160.
130. Id. at 179–83.
131. Id. at 164–65.
132. Scopetta, 344 F.3d 54.
133. Scopetta, 820 N.E.2d 840.
134. Leslie Kaufman, Abuse Victims and the City Settle Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2004, at
B1.
135. WEINSTEIN, supra note 52.
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new thinking.  Beyond this, awareness of this work by judges, attor-
neys, and three generations of law students certainly has further bol-
stered his reputation.137
D. Persuasion: Scholarship
Judge Weinstein has written two books and hundreds of law review
articles while on the bench.  Some of this work deals with jurispruden-
tial problems he has faced as a judge.  Much, however, has dealt with
the administration of justice.  Judge Weinstein has given an immense
amount of time to writing on matters affecting the legal system that
are not strictly related to specific cases.  Many articles have proposed
innovations in judicial administration that have been adopted.
The first of the two books Judge Weinstein has written while on the
bench is Reform of Court Rule-Making Procedures.138  The book grew
at least in part out of Judge Weinstein’s experience with the drafting
of the Federal Rules of Evidence and from the process by which a rule
on speedy trials adopted by the Eastern District was rejected by the
Second Circuit.139  Judge Weinstein dealt with the subject in lectures
at the law schools of the Ohio State University, the University of Con-
necticut, and Columbia University, and then published them in a
book.140  In the book, Judge Weinstein proposed that the Supreme
Court get out of the rule-making business, that Congress confine itself
to substantive privileges, and that all rules would require approval of
the United States Judicial Conference’s Standing Committee on Rules
of Procedure of the Judicial Process.  He argued as well that the rule-
making process in the federal courts, generally and in local districts,
be more representative, public, and open.
Judge Weinstein’s other book, Individual Justice in Mass Tort Liti-
gation: The Effect of Class Actions and Other Multiparty Devices,141
136. MORGAN ET AL., supra note 36; see also ROSENBERG & WEINSTEIN, supra note 35.  His
treatise on New York Civil Procedure, in seven volumes as revised, continues to be in use almost
fifty years after first publication. WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 34.
137. It is not unheard of in Judge Weinstein’s courtroom that an attorney will object to the
admission of evidence and, in response to Judge Weinstein’s query for authority, say (as Judge
Weinstein relates it), “Well, it just seems wrong judge, I’m not sure why, but you’re the expert.”
Weinstein Oral History, supra note 20, at 561.  Occasionally, though rarely, the court of appeals
will reverse an evidentiary ruling of Judge Weinstein. See, e.g., United States v. Jamal, 546 F.
Supp. 646 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), rev’d, 707 F2d 638 (2d Cir. 1983).  Even in reversing his decision,
though, the court of appeals cited to Judge Weinstein’s evidence treatise. Id. at 642.
138. WEINSTEIN, supra note 49.
139. James L. Oakes, Book Review, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 205 (1978) (reviewing WEINSTEIN,
supra note 49).
140. WEINSTEIN, supra note 49.
141. WEINSTEIN, supra note 50.
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dealt with the role of courts in mass disasters.  Arguing that individual
justice must be provided in a mass society, he outlined the steps that
could be taken by sensitive, imaginative, independent judges, and law-
yers to establish an empathetic relationship with those seeking
justice.142
Judge Weinstein has written a number of law review articles in
which he offers his perspective after having been intensely involved
with cases in a particular area.  Among these are articles, which are
among his finest, on Social Security disability cases,143 structural law-
suits,144 cases involving public schools,145 and class actions.146  A num-
ber deal with evidentiary problems,147 and others with sentencing.148
There are many articles supporting particular innovations.149  The
range of subjects Judge Weinstein has written on is remarkable.  He
has written on the use of interns in the courts,150 the disqualification
of judges,151 the teaching of legal ethics,152 the availability of judicial
opinions,153 secrecy in civil trials,154 the environment,155 and the teach-
ing of evidence.156
142. WEINSTEIN, supra note 50, at 2–3.
143. Jack B. Weinstein, Equality and the Law: Social Security Disability Cases in the Federal
Courts, 35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 897 (1984).
144. Jack B. Weinstein, Litigation Seeking Changes in Public Behavior and Institutions—Some
Views on Participation, 13 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 231 (1980).
145. See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, Equality, Liberty and the Public Schools: The Role of State
Courts, 1 CARDOZO L. REV. 343 (1979); Jack B. Weinstein, Equality, Liberty, and the Public
Schools, 48 U. CIN. L. REV. 203 (1979).
146. See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of the Court in Toxic Tort Litigation, 73 GEO. L.J.
1389 (1985).
147. See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, The Examination of Witnesses, in 2 A.L.I.-A.B.A, THE PRAC-
TICAL LAWYER’S MANUAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE PRACTICE 91 (1979).
148. See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, Lecture, A Trial Judge’s First Impression of the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines, 52 ALB. L. REV. 1 (1987).
149. See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, Proper and Improper Interactions Between Bench and Law
School: Law Student Practice, Law Student Clerkships, and Rules for Admission to the Federal
Bar, 50 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 441 (1976).
150. Id.
151. See, e.g., Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York, Panel Discussion, Disqualification of
Judges (The Sarokin Matter): Is It a Threat to Judicial Independence?, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 1063
(1993) (including Jack B. Weinstein among the participants).
152. See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, On the Teaching of Legal Ethics, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 452
(1972).
153. See, e.g., Jack B Weinstein, Symposium, Factors in Determining the Degree of Public
Availability of Judicial Opinions, 2 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 244 (1993).
154. See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, Secrecy in Civil Trials: Some Tentative Views, 9 J.L. & POL’Y
53 (2000).
155. See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, Why Protect the Environment for Others?, 77 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 217 (2003).
156. Jack B. Weinstein, Is There Scholarship After Death or Are Evidence Teachers Needed
After the Federal Rules?, 41 MD. L. REV. 209 (1982).
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E. Persuasion: Speeches
Judge Weinstein has said: “I’ve never ignored the opportunity of a
public forum to make a little substantive statement,” and he has spo-
ken of stages or podiums as “a kind of bully pulpit available to
judges.”157  Certainly, during his eight years as Chief Judge of the
Eastern District, he represented his court and spoke on many occa-
sions.  But over his forty-seven years on the bench, he has given hun-
dreds of speeches: commencement addresses, speeches both
presenting awards and accepting them, eulogies and speeches at me-
morials, and reflections on his own experiences.  He has spoken
throughout the New York Metropolitan area, at dozens of law schools
and bar associations throughout the country, and in Toronto, London,
Belfast, Geneva, Jerusalem, and other cities abroad.  He even gives an
annual sermon at Temple Emanuel in Great Neck, New York.  Some
of the speeches have, with small modifications, been used more than
once, and some have then been revised and published in the books on
rule making and class actions, in law reviews, and as op-ed pieces.
Some have been short and relatively light, but many engage with sub-
stantive problems.
What audiences has Judge Weinstein tried to reach with his
speeches?  Professor Baum suggests that the lawyers who practice
before trial judges are an important reference group or audience, stat-
ing that: “A judge’s reputation in the legal community as a whole and
in the broader community is based largely on the judgments of law-
yers who practice in the judge’s court.”158  But Baum also states that
judges may aim their opinions at fellow judges in the same court-
house, former clerks, former colleagues, and for seminars that train
judges.159  Judge Weinstein has spoken to all these audiences.
Certainly, attorneys are a group that Judge Weinstein has tried to
reach—sometimes to educate, and sometimes to ask for help.  Bar as-
sociations have offered an important podium.  Both with the New
York CPLR and Federal Rules of Evidence, Judge Weinstein used the
platforms of bar associations to explain reforms he had been involved
with and to attempt to influence the way they would be used.  He also
did this when the Eastern District adopted new rules of practice.160
157. Weinstein Oral History, supra note 20, at 1091–92.
158. BAUM, supra note 117, at 99.
159. Id. at 103.
160. Jack B. Weinstein, Panel on Modern Federal Discovery Practice in the Southern and
Eastern District of New York: Reform or Conflict? (Oct. 1, 1984) (copy of cover of program on
file with author).  Judge Weinstein also has used bar association platforms to encourage more
pro bono work by attorneys.
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Another very important audience for Judge Weinstein to reach has
been the “legal academy.”  After all, for about three decades of his
judgeship, Judge Weinstein remained a full-time professor.  As a Co-
lumbia Law School professor, he was in frequent contact with his col-
leagues, and he employed them in his judicial work.  Louis Lusky, for
example, was appointed by Judge Weinstein to represent Vietnam
War evaders living in Canada.161  Curtis Berger acted as Special
Master in the Coney Island desegregation case.162  Harold Korn was a
strong booster of Judge Weinstein’s views on jurisdiction,163 while the
Judge continued to discuss legal questions with the nation’s outstand-
ing scholar on conflict of laws, Willis Reese.164  The Judge appointed
Gerard Lynch to evaluate his experiment in appointing coordinating
counsel in a mega-criminal case.165  Judge Weinstein also team-taught
courses at Columbia with Kent Greenawalt and Jack Greenberg,
among others, and was in close touch with members of the Brooklyn
Law School faculty, whose offices were only a couple of blocks away.
That legal academics were an important reference group for Judge
Weinstein may be suggested by the many occasions he addressed legal
educators or spoke (and wrote) about legal education.166  Judge Wein-
stein believes deeply in the need for cooperation between the courts,
the bar, and the law schools.  As Chief Judge, he encouraged the crea-
tion of a course at Brooklyn Law School to evaluate the impact of the
1983 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Eastern District’s new standing orders on discovery practice, while at
the same time, students were taught how to conduct discovery without
abuse.167
As Judge Weinstein settled in on the bench, his work began to
evoke considerable interest and admiration from law school profes-
sors all over the country.  Law professors whose specialties included
161. MORRIS, supra note 27, at 126.
162. See generally Curtis J. Berger, Away from the Court House and into the Field: The Odys-
sey of a Special Master, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 707 (1978).
163. See Harold L. Korn, Essay, Rethinking Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Mass
Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2183 (1997).
164. Weinstein Oral History, supra note 20, at 199, 214–15, 1129.
165. Id. at 217.
166. See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, Remarks at the Dedication of the Courthouse on the Hofstra
Campus, Uniondale, N.Y.: The Teaching Court 2 (Apr. 5, 1982); Jack B. Weinstein, Address at
AALS Workshop on the Teaching of Evidence (Oct. 17, 1981); Jack B. Weinstein, Address at the
First Annual Meeting of the Society of American Law Teachers in San Francisco: Some Ques-
tions About the Role of Law Professors (Dec. 29, 1974).  Copies of all three speeches are on file
with the author.
167. Jack B. Weinstein, Remarks at the Benjamin N. Cardozo Law Review Reception for
Alumni: Legal Education: A Partnership Among Law Schools, Law Firms and Courts 21–22
(Mar. 31, 1985) (on file with author).
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torts, procedure, and evidence began to follow his work carefully.
Like other strong-minded judges who sought acceptance of their
views—justices such as Hugo Black and Felix Frankfurter, and judges
such as David L. Bazelon—acolytes burgeoned in the legal academy.
Some were former clerks—such as John Goldberg of Harvard Law
School and Margaret Berger and Anita Bernstein of Brooklyn Law
School—but there were many other admirers, including Burt
Neuborne of New York University School of Law, David Luban of
Georgetown, and Peter Tillers, now a retired Cardozo Law School
professor.
F. Persuasion: Correspondence
Judge Weinstein keeps family and professional and personal friends
abreast of his work by sending out copies of his opinions, speeches,
articles, and op-ed pieces.  Heavy brown envelopes from Judge Wein-
stein used to arrive at my home once or twice a week, though they
now have given way at least partially to attachments to email.  Fur-
ther, Judge Weinstein writes about a thousand or more notes a year to
acquaintances, and he reads and responds to those who send him their
scholarship.
In addition, he has engaged in a great deal of professional corre-
spondence.  Much of this is with law professors, but public officials are
also included.  Judge Weinstein wrote a series of letters between Feb-
ruary 19 and March 7, 2003 to then-United States Attorney Roslyn R.
Mauskopf (now his colleague on the bench) on such matters as the
medical care for detainees at Brooklyn Metropolitan Detention
Center and the warnings in appropriate languages to ensure air pas-
sengers were aware that they had to report the amount of currency
they were carrying out of the country over $10,000.168
Much of Judge Weinstein’s correspondence with law school profes-
sors results from his reading of their articles, commenting, and asking
serious questions.  To choose just one day: on July 13, 1981, Judge
Weinstein wrote Professors James Vorenberg169 and Charles R. Nes-
son of the Harvard Law School170 and Professor Charles David Phil-
168. Letters from Jack B. Weinstein, to Roslyn R. Mauskopf (Feb. 19, Feb. 20 & Mar. 7, 2003)
(on file with author).
169. Letter from Jack B. Weinstein, to James Vorenberg, Law Professor and Dean, Harvard
Law School (July 13, 1981) (on file with author).
170. Letter from Jack B. Weinstein, to Charles R. Nesson, Law Professor, Harvard Law
School (July 13, 1981) (on file with author).
304 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:279
lips of the School of Law at the University of North Carolina171
responding to their writings on sentencing and evidence.
G. Persuasion: Ability To Get Attention for His Views
Essential to Judge Weinstein’s successes in persuasion has been his
ability to attract attention for his decisions, ideas, and activities far
beyond the Eastern District of New York.  This is no small matter.
Even the Chief Justice of the United States releases his annual year-
end report on the state of the judiciary just before or on New Year’s
Day, a very slow news period, in order to attract media attention.172
Somehow, Judge Weinstein’s cases seem to get more attention than
those of most other judges.  Asked why his cases involving the New
York City schools received so much more attention than those of his
colleagues, Judge Weinstein offered this reason:
I think what happened was that they blew up under me.  That is,
when I got them I ran with them and they therefore became bigger
than they might otherwise have been.  I guess I could have decided
this case on much narrower grounds and so without this enormous
set of hearings and discussions; the same thing was true of Lora and
true of a number of other cases.  I was interested in the case.  Don’t
forget that I had been involved in the Brown [v. Board of Educa-
tion] case.173
Another time, when asked about the visibility of his cases, he said, “I
got them, and when I did get them, I ran with them.”174
Putting casebooks aside, there is probably more material written
about Judge Weinstein than about any other federal lower court
judge, save possibly, Judge Richard Posner of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.  There are an unusual number of
interviews and articles about him.  Judge Weinstein may be the only
sitting federal district judge who has been the subject of profiles in
both the New Yorker175 and New York Magazine.176  Judge Wein-
stein’s decisions often are front-page news in the New York Times.177
171. Letter from Jack B. Weinstein, to Charles David Phillips, Law Professor, University of
North Carolina (July 13, 1981) (on file with author).
172. See Chief Justice’s Year-End Reports on the Federal Judiciary, SUP. CT. U.S. (Jan. 16,
2015), http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/year-endreports.aspx.
173. Weinstein Oral History, supra note 20, at 454.
174. Id. at 294.
175. Jeffrey Toobin, Benchmark, NEW YORKER, May 3, 1993, at 35–36.
176. Robert Kolker, High Caliber Justice, N.Y. MAG., Apr. 5, 1999, at 32–37.
177. See, e.g., A. G. Sulzberger, Defiant Judge Takes on Child Pornography Law, N.Y. TIMES,
May 22, 2010, at A1 (reporting on United States v. Polouizzi, 687 F. Supp. 2d 133 (E.D.N.Y.
2010)); Philip S. Gutis, Lilco Is Reported in Pact To Settle Racketeering Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14,
1989, at A1 (reporting on Cnty. of Sufffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 710 F. Supp. 1407
(E.D.N.Y. 1989)).
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Furthermore, his opinions reach the New York bar often because they
consistently appear on the front page of the New York Law Jour-
nal.178  His op-ed contributions have often appeared in the New York
Times,179 thus reaching opinion makers throughout the country.
What some believe to be an unjudicial courting of publicity arises
from Judge Weinstein’s belief that, in matters of public importance,
the court serves as a kind of forum: “It helps,” he has said, “to make
the issue known to the public, both the general public, if the press
picks it up, but, even more important, the narrower public, the admin-
istrators, the middle level people, the people [who] make day to day
decisions.”180
Judge Weinstein routinely sends copies of his opinions and speeches
to reporters assigned to the Brooklyn courthouse.181  From time to
time, he has met with individual members of the press, at their re-
quest, to explain the background of cases.  His opinions are often
quotable, and his visits to the sites of cases make good copy.
Yet, compared to what elected officials do, Judge Weinstein’s in-
volvement with the media has been rather tame and traditional—
making opinions more readable, preparing synopses, notifying the
press when hearings take place, and seeing to it that copies of docu-
ments are consistently available.  If the number of interviews he has
given and the number of profiles that have appeared in newspapers
and magazines are considerably greater than those of other federal
judges, it is because many have appeared in specialized magazines
(such as alumni publications), and their content is fairly
circumspect.182
This can be said as well for Judge Weinstein’s relationship to televi-
sion.  While he has been a strong supporter of televising court pro-
ceedings, has allowed coverage of hearings in his own court, and has
been willing to participate in Fred Friendly’s seminars about the me-
dia and the courts, he has not been directly interviewed on television.
When all is said and done, his “persuasiveness” has largely been due
178. See e.g., Andrew Keshner, Judge Who Guided Pro Se Plaintiff Recuses Himself Sua
Sponte, N.Y.L.J., Jan 14, 2015, at 1; Mark Hamblett, U.S. Judge Orders Cuomo To Call Special
Election, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 18, 2015, at 1.
179. See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, Bombs Believed Outlawed, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1954, at E8;
Jack B. Weinstein, The War on Drugs Is Self-Defeating, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1993, at A19.
180. Weinstein Oral History, supra note 20, at 478; see also id. at 997.
181. Id. at 263.
182. See, however, the very interesting interview of Judge Weinstein on the Agent Orange
litigation that appeared in JOEL COHEN, BLINDFOLDS OFF: JUDGES ON HOW THEY DECIDE
284–94 (2014).
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to his opinions, law review articles, speeches before professional
groups, and participation in professional conferences.
H. Other Areas of Persuasion: Employment of Magistrate Judges
and Special Masters
One perfectly legitimate way for a federal judge to enhance his in-
fluence in a particular case, most usually in structural law suits and
class actions, is to employ United States magistrate judges and special
masters to deal with matters that may need to be done but might not
be accomplished because of lack of time, or which might be inappro-
priate for an Article III judge to do, or which should be done but need
not be done by an Article III judge.  Judge Weinstein believes strongly
in the value of United States magistrate judges.  As the workload of
the Eastern District became greater when Judge Weinstein became
Chief Judge, he increased his personal use of magistrate judges, and
when new standing orders were adopted by the court, magistrate
judges began to handle most of discovery.183  The use of magistrate
judges in the Eastern District of New York has been pathbreaking,
and Judge Weinstein has been an important influence on it.
The use of a magistrate judge as a special master was essential to
Judge Weinstein’s credibility in the Agent Orange case.  When he took
over the class action as a result of a colleague’s elevation to the Sec-
ond Circuit, Judge Weinstein told the attorneys that he expected to go
to trial in six months.  He appointed then-Magistrate Judge Shira
Scheindlin184 as Special Master and directed her to take the lawyers
on a “forced march” to trial.185  Devoting practically full time to the
case, Magistrate Judge Scheindlin oversaw a process whereby three
years of normal discovery were telescoped into three months.  She
held daily, nightly, and Sunday meetings with the attorneys.186
While Judge Weinstein is by no means the originator of the use of
special masters, he has employed them creatively and effectively to
supervise and control discovery; for fact-finding, negotiation, and me-
diation; as experts to advise him; to clarify problem areas; to get infor-
mation to the parties and from the parties to him; to reach out to
different groups in the community; as a political buffer; and to imple-
ment decrees.  He has used them in sensitive public school disciplinary
183. Weinstein Oral History, supra note 20, at 99–100, 1425, 1611–12, 1724.
184. Now judge of the Southern District of New York.
185. PETER SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE COURTS 122
(1986).
186. MORRIS, supra note 27, at 327–28.  Judge Weinstein strongly favors the greater integra-
tion of the magistrate judges into the court.  Weinstein Oral History, supra note 20, at 1425, 1724.
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matters, as settlement masters, to explain the court’s role to the pub-
lic, and to build consensus for a solution.187  Special masters, as now-
Judge Scheindlin has pointed out, conduct ex parte contacts with par-
ties and attorneys and deal with experts outside the presence of par-
ties or attorneys.188  Thus, special masters can act as a buffer, for the
judge as well as add to his persuasive abilities by representing his
views strongly.
Judge Weinstein has made particular use of the talented and ubiqui-
tous Kenneth Feinberg.  In Agent Orange, Feinberg was one of three
special masters who developed the plan for the settlement and its dis-
tribution, which he oversaw.189  In the case involving the Shoreham
Nuclear Reactor, Feinberg acted as a mediator, as well as a communi-
cations link, to Governor Mario Cuomo, whose support for the settle-
ment was essential.190  Feinberg was also one of four settlement
masters for parts of the Zyprexa litigation, where he was employed for
both his political contacts and for the handling of claims.191  He was
also jointly appointed by Judge Weinstein and New York State Judge
Helen Freedman in some of the asbestos cases.192
I. Persuasion: Federal Judicial Administration
Judge Weinstein’s major contributions to federal judicial adminis-
tration have been his role in drafting the Federal Rules of Evidence193
and his work in the field of class actions, both discussed later.  Judge
Weinstein has not left a large mark on federal judicial administration,
187. Id. at 1675, 1736, 1596, 1658.
188. See 80th Birthday Roundtable, supra note 55, at 168.
189. MORRIS, supra note 27, at 330–31, 335.  Feinberg’s career as mediator and implementer
for the distribution of claims took off after Judge Weinstein employed him in Agent Orange.  He
has since played important roles in the distribution of funds created to compensate victims of a
number of disasters including the September 11th Victims Compensation Fund, the fund set up
for victims of the Boston Marathon terrorist attack, and the British Petroleum Oil Spill.  Elise
Amendola, Meet Kenneth Feinberg: The Man Who Puts a Price on Pain, NBC NEWS (May 14,
2013, 12:57 AM), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/05/14/18107596-meet-kenneth-fein
berg-the-man-who-puts-a-price-on-pain?.
190. MORRIS, supra note 27, at 87, 204.
191. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 433 F. Supp. 268 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (order requiring
settling plaintiffs to submit claims to special settlement masters); see also In re Zyprexa Prods.
Liab. Litig., No. MDL-1596, 2006 WL 898105 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2006) (order appointing a spe-
cial master for discovery); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 04-MD-01596 (JBW), 2005 WL
3117302 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2005) (order approving a final settlement); MORRIS, supra note 27,
at 366; Weinstein Oral History, supra note 20, at 1935–36.
192. Weinstein Oral History, supra note 20, at 1754.
193. Judge Weinstein did use his influence to see that Margaret Berger became the reporter of
the new Judicial Conference committee on evidence rules.  Weinstein Oral History, supra note
20, at 358–59.
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the way, for example, Chief Judge Irving Kaufman of the Second Cir-
cuit tried to do.194
However, in his eight years as Chief Judge of the Eastern Dis-
trict,195 Judge Weinstein did have significant accomplishments.  He
considered his major efforts: (1) setting in motion the process for
modifying the Court’s rules for handling criminal and civil cases, em-
phasizing practicality and civility during pretrial proceedings; (2) as-
sisting the poor in civil cases by way of creating a special panel of
attorneys to handle their civil suits pro bono;196 (3) introducing a pro-
gram of using magistrates to oversee all discovery in civil cases;197 (4)
defending the judges against interference or threats to their indepen-
dence, such as “encroachments” in the administrative sphere by the
Circuit Council; (5) sparing his colleagues the “junky bureaucratic
stuff”;198 (6) maintaining close relationships with the bar; (7) seeing
the court as a bridge to the law schools, the poor, and the community;
(8) fighting off efforts to split the District;199 and (9) quashing all law-
yer disciplinary matters.200  As Chief Judge, Judge Weinstein was also
a gadfly, opposing the proposals of Chief Justice Warren Burger and
Chief Judge Irving Kaufman for the certification of trial advocates and
opposing their opposition to the use of television in the courts.201
J. Persuasion: Extrajudicial Organizations
It is beyond the scope of this article to describe the role Judge Jack
Weinstein has played in extrajudicial organizations.  Judge Weinstein
has been heavily involved with organizations relating directly to juris-
prudence, especially with the American Law Institute.  There, he is
particularly influential in the areas of complex litigation and mass
torts, while also contributing in other fields.202  He has also been in-
194. See infra Part V.
195. Judge Weinstein served as the Chief Judge of the Eastern District from 1980 to 1988.
196. See MORRIS, supra note 27, at 87.
197. WEINSTEIN, supra note 47, at 130.
198. Weinstein Oral History, supra note 20, at 1297.
199. See MORRIS, supra note 27, at 202–05, 207.
200. Weinstein Oral History, supra note 20, at 624.
201. Elected for a three-year term to the U.S. Judicial Conference, Judge Weinstein stoutly
objected to its certification of Harry Claiborne, a Nevada district judge, for impeachment, be-
lieving that the impeachment of judges was entirely a matter for the Congress.  Judge Weinstein
was also a member of the Subcommittee on Federal Jurisdiction of the Judicial Conference Com-
mittee on Court Administration (1969–75) and a member of the Special Advisory Group to the
Chief Justice on Problems Related to Federal Civil Litigation (1971).  Judge Weinstein does not
seem to have played an important role in the Second Circuit Judicial Conference.
202. See also, e.g., WEINSTEIN, supra note 50, at 9; see, e.g., Letter from Jack B. Weinstein to
Telford Taylor, Professor of Law, Columbia Law School (May 24, 1971) (discussing tentative
Draft No. 4 of the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure) (on file with author).
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volved with organizations which are relevant to his judicial and per-
sonal interests in science, medicine, technology, and statistics.  Judge
Weinstein has traveled abroad for human rights inspections in Peru,
Russia, and other former Soviet republics.  He has also been involved
with a number of organizations concerned with Jewish matters, per-
haps most importantly serving as Chairman of the United Jewish Ap-
peal’s Committee on Rescue of Soviet Jews.
K. Persuasion: Miscellany
While probably not within Walter Murphy’s conception of the use
of persuasion, there are two other areas related to Judge Weinstein’s
persuasive influence—the “related case” phenomenon and Judge
Weinstein’s personal endowments to his court—which deserve brief
mention.
Judge Weinstein has been criticized for the unusual number of
prominent class actions and aggregated cases that have ended up
before him.  To some, it appears that there have been so many that it
does not seem credible that they came directly off the “wheel.”  In-
deed, plaintiffs’ attorneys, aware of Judge Weinstein’s abilities and
sympathies, have guided cases to him by employing the Eastern Dis-
trict’s “related case” rule.  Under that rule, when a plaintiff’s attorney
files a case, he or she may indicate that the case is “related” to another
case that has already been decided (or at least assigned) to a particu-
lar judge.203  Then, the new case will be assigned to that judge.204  For
example, the class actions involving light cigarettes went to Judge
Weinstein because the Johns Manville Trust was suing the tobacco in-
dustry and Judge Weinstein already had Manville Trust cases involving
personal injury cases that resulted from asbestos exposure.  A second
way Judge Weinstein has received high-profile class actions and aggre-
gated cases, such as those involving Zyprexa, has been by assignment
by the MDL Panel (Panel).205  However, making allowance for the
cases sent by the Panel, it still cannot be denied that because of the
successful forum shopping of plaintiffs’ lawyers, Judge Weinstein be-
came the central decision maker of litigation over mass tort actions
against the tobacco and firearms industries, even though the alleged
harms were nationwide and no major manufacturer in either industry
was located in the Eastern District.206
203. E.D.N.Y. R. 13.
204. Id.
205. See, e.g., In re Zyprexa, 433 F. Supp. 2d 268 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
206. Judge Jose Cabranes of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit called attention to
this phenomenon.  Joseph Goldstein, Judge Lands at Center of a New York Legal Mystery, N.Y.
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Judge Weinstein, who became independently wealthy from his trea-
tises and casebooks, has personally endowed and urged others to do-
nate funds to the District Court for the Eastern District for services
aimed at trying to redress the limitations of the poor in civil litigation.
When he was Chief Judge, Judge Weinstein created the Eastern Dis-
trict Litigation Fund to reimburse pro bono counsel and social work-
ers for moneys spent on behalf of defendants and their families.  He
also created and funded the Bessie Brodach Weinstein Library and an
emergency assistance fund for persons needing help when they are in
the courthouse.207
V. BRIEF CASE STUDIES IN PERSUASION: JUDGE WEINSTEIN ON
SENTENCING AND CLASS ACTIONS IN MASS TORTS
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines), composed by a
sentencing commission created by Congress in 1984, came to be bit-
terly opposed by many district judges for their harshness and rigidity.
After a battle lasting two decades, the effects of the Guidelines were
greatly limited by decisions of the Supreme Court.208  Judge Weinstein
was by no means alone in the struggle, but he was on the front lines.
The Guidelines limited judicial discretion, generally an unattractive
proposition for judges. They were also very harsh.  For Judge Wein-
stein, they were particularly offensive because they banished human-
ity from the sentencing process.  Judge Weinstein devised ingenious
ways to circumvent the Guidelines in his sentences, but his opposition
did not stop there.  Judge Weinstein employed law review articles, op-
ed pieces, speeches at meetings of judges, and even a well-publicized
refusal209 to handle the sentencing of drug couriers in order to rally
opposition to the Guidelines.  He attempted to educate judges ap-
pointed after Guideline sentencing had begun, to teach defense law-
yers, to sensitize Assistant United States Attorneys, and to put words
into the mouths of defendants to try to reduce what he saw as great
cruelty.  Over and over, he reminded his audiences that those being
sentenced were not numbers, but real people: pregnant Ghanaian
SUN (Dec. 3, 2007), http://www.nysun.com/new-york/judge-lands-at-center-of-a-new-york-legal-
mystery/67380/.
207. As County Attorney for Nassau County fifty years ago, Judge Weinstein was responsible
for the creation of what now is known as Nassau/Suffolk Legal Services.  Weinstein Oral History,
supra note 20, at 368.
208. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007); see also Kimbrough v. United States, 552
U.S. 85 (2007).
209. Joseph B. Treaster, 2 Judges Decline Drug Cases, Protesting Sentencing Rules, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 17, 1993, at A1.
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women, battered Colombian wives, Pakistani restaurateurs, and strug-
gling immigrant mothers from the Dominican Republic.210
Judge Weinstein’s early reaction to the Guidelines had not been
hostile, although he expressed concerns about them.211  But by the
time he spoke at the Sentencing Institute for the Second and Eighth
Circuits in 1992, he was finding the Guidelines harsh, inflexible, and
expensive in their effect.  But, he also said, at the time, that he was not
having very much trouble working with the Guidelines—he had not
yet been forced to impose a sentence that he found offensive.212  He
could, he explained, capitalize on circumstances, such as a drug cou-
rier’s pregnancy at the time of arrest, to avoid the Guideline
sentence.213
However, by 1992, he was actively searching for ways to depart
from the Guidelines.214  Sometimes he would manipulate the facts of a
case.215  Sometimes he would “lead” the defendant at the sentencing
hearing to set up a reason to depart.216  One of his most important
efforts to limit the effect of the Guidelines was by importing into sen-
tencing traditional principles of mens rea.217  This ultimately proved
futile.218
In a case involving fifty-five welfare-cheating Dominican mothers,
Judge Weinstein interpreted three statutory sections in a way that
minimized their influence so that their children would not be left with-
out a mother at home.219  In those cases, he was able to sentence the
defendants to community service, home detention, and supervised re-
lease, along with fines, restitution, or both.220  But, while the sentences
of the Dominican mothers survived, Judge Weinstein’s attempt, in a
210. See e.g., United States v. Pokuaa, 782 F. Supp. 747 (1992).
211. See Weinstein, supra note 148.
212. Jack B. Weinstein, A Trial Judge’s Reflections on Departures from the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, FED. SENT’G REP., July–Aug. 1992, at 6, 6–7.
213. United States v. Pokuaa, 782 F. Supp. 747, 748 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); see also United States v.
Gaviria, 804 F. Supp. 476, 481 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); United States v. Concepcion, 795 F. Supp. 1262,
1270 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
214. Weinstein Oral History, supra note 20, at 1107.
215. See, e.g., United States v. Jonas, 842 F. Supp. 1533, 1533–34 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
216. See, e.g., Sentencing Transcript, United States v. Rodriguez, No. 1:95-cr-00401 (E.D.N.Y.
Dec. 27, 1995) (on file with author).
217. See, e.g., United States v. Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F. Supp. 485 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
218. United States v. Ekwunoh, 813 F. Supp. 168 (E.D.N.Y.), rev’d, 12 F.3d 368 (2d Cir. 1993),
on remand 888 F. Supp. 364 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).  Ekwunoh would ultimately be spared a possible
ten-to forty-year sentence by the passage of legislation.
219. United States v. Concepcion, 795 F. Supp. 1262 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); see also United States v.
Concepcion, 825 F. Supp. 19 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
220. Concepcion, 795 F. Supp. at 1262.  Judge Weinstein saw the women as “very good
mothers” who were stealing “to give the children something better.”  Weinstein Oral History,
supra note 20, at 1150.
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scandal involving the bribing of taxicab inspectors, to punish the “little
guys” less than the “big fish,” who had cooperated with the govern-
ment, was only a partial success.221
By 1995, Judge Weinstein was strongly attacking the Guidelines in
articles222 and speeches.223  In some of them, he implied that the judge
sentencing under the Guidelines faced a moral dilemma reminiscent
of those faced by lawyers and judges during the Third Reich and
Vichy France.224  However, the action Judge Weinstein took that at-
tracted the most attention was his joining his old friend, Judge Whit-
man Knapp of the Southern District of New York, in a statement that
they would no longer hear drug cases.  The statement and Judge Wein-
stein’s speech about it at Cardozo Law School received a good deal of
attention from the press throughout the nation.225
In the mid-1990s, tensions between Judge Weinstein and the court
of appeals over sentencing grew.226  There was a public brouhaha over
Judge Weinstein’s light sentence of a drug courier so that he and his
wife could be able to conceive a child.227  The court of appeals set
221. United States v. DeRiggi, 45 F.3d 713 (2d Cir.), on remand 893 F. Supp. 171 (E.D.N.Y.),
aff’d, 72 F.3d 7 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam).
222. See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein & Fred A. Bernstein, The Denigration of Mens Rea in Drug
Sentencing, FED. SENT’G REP., Nov.–Dec. 1994; Jack B. Weinstein, The Effect of Sentencing on
Women, Men, the Family, and the Community, 5 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 169 (1996); Jack B.
Weinstein & Nicholas R. Turner, The Cost of Avoiding Injustice by Guideline Circumventions,
FED. SENT’G REP., May–June 1997.
223. See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, Speech at the Lewis and Clark Law School: The Trial Judge’s
Dual Obligations to Act Independently and with Humanity (Feb. 21, 1996); Jack B. Weinstein,
Remarks at Sentencing Seminar at New York University School of Law: Avoiding Cruelty at
Sentencing While Protecting the Public: A View from the Federal Bench (Apr. 8, 1998); Jack B.
Weinstein, Jamie Lehmann Memorial Lecture at Fifth Avenue Synagogue in New York City:
Does Religion Have a Role in Criminal Sentencing? (June 4, 2007).  Copies of all speeches are
on file with the author.
224. See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, Symposium, Nazis in the Courtroom, Lessons from the Con-
duct of Lawyers and Judges Under the Laws of the Third Reich and Vichy, France, 61 BROOK. L.
REV. 1122 (1995); Jack B. Weinstein, Every Day Is a Good Day for a Judge To Lay Down His
Professional Life for Justice, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 131 (2004); Jack B. Weinstein, Speech at the
Court of Military Appeals: When Should Judges Let Their Conscience Speak (May 18, 2005) (on
file with author).
225. MORRIS, supra note 27, at 269 (discussing articles and editorials from 1993, including
those that appeared in the New York Law Journal on Apr. 15 and Apr. 17, The Washington Post
on May 1, The San Francisco Chronicle on July 18, and The Florida Sun on Aug. 15, 1993); see
also Jack B. Weinstein, Why I Won’t Try Any More Drug Cases, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 26, 1993, at
14.  Judge Weinstein did eventually go back to handling drug cases.  Weinstein Oral History,
supra note 20, at 1494–95.
226. Not all of the cases involved reversals of Judge Weinstein for being too lenient. See, e.g.,
United States v. Tropiano, 50 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 1995).
227. United States v. Londono, 76 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that Judge Weinstein erred
in downwardly departing from the Sentencing Guidelines).
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aside the sentence and ordered the matter assigned to a different
judge.228
Nevertheless, during the last decade of “mandatory” sentencing
under the Guidelines, Judge Weinstein consistently searched for loop-
holes with which to ameliorate harsh results.  In United States v.
Liu,229 he employed the defendant’s pathological addiction to gam-
bling.230  In United States v. Hammond,231 he held that HIV-positive
status could be considered as a basis for leniency.232  Judge Weinstein
also employed a technique of delaying sentencing to allow the defen-
dant to make a record of rehabilitation.233  When Congress authorized
the courts of appeals to resentence defendants de novo where a down-
ward departure by a district judge was not justified, Judge Weinstein’s
response was to videotape all of his sentencings.  Although he offered
a generalization for doing it—to “assist the [appellate]  judges in their
new onerous task”234—his real reason was to humanize the defendant.
He wanted the appellate court to see the defendant’s facial expres-
sions and body language, the severity of the defendant’s infirmity, and
the depth of the defendant’s family’s reliance.235
Judge Jack Weinstein was one of the fiercest and most eloquent
voices battling the Guidelines’ regime.  He employed his ingenuity to
avoid results he thought cruel and harsh, while through opinions, arti-
cles, and speeches, he attempted to educate less senior colleagues
throughout the nation, defense lawyers, assistant United States attor-
neys, and the court of appeals.
Judge Weinstein has made even greater efforts at persuasion in the
field of mass tort class actions.236  The Agent Orange litigation greatly
spurred the use of class actions for mass torts.237  During the three
decades since then, Judge Weinstein has been heavily involved in a
number of other important mass tort class actions in which he has
written many dozens of published opinions.  He also wrote a book
dealing with how the United States legal system deals with disas-
228. United States v. Londino, 100 F.3d 236 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Judge Weinstein’s handling of
this case makes an exorbitant claim on appellate resources.  Accordingly, we direct that further
proceedings be assigned to a different judge . . . .”); see also MORRIS, supra note 27, at 274–75.
229. 267 F. Supp. 2d 371 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
230. Id. at 376–77.
231. 37 F. Supp. 2d 204 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
232. Id. at 207–210.
233. United States v. Flowers, 983 F. Supp. 159 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
234. In re Sentencing, 219 F.R.D. 262 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
235. Id. at 264.
236. See Morris, supra note 16.
237. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718 (1983).
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ters,238 as well as law review articles and speeches on a whole range of
problems, from the definition of classes and subclasses to jurisdiction,
choice of law, excessive jury awards, lawyers’ ethics, attorneys’ fees,
the use of statistics, and how a judge should handle the scientific testi-
mony of expert witnesses.  Professor Linda Mullenix stated in her Ar-
ticle for this Symposium that there has probably been no judge more
identified with the aggregate litigation movement of the late-twentieth
century than Judge Weinstein, who has earned the title “King of Mass
Torts.”239
VI. ESTEEM
Walter Murphy identified another tactic that could be used to en-
hance influence, “esteem.”240  Murphy argues that in disposing one
actor to respond positively to another’s attempt at influence are
likeability and thoughtful gestures, which could merge with profes-
sional esteem—respect for judgment, knowledge, or skills of an-
other.241  This is one of the reasons often given for Chief Justice John
Marshall’s imprint on the Supreme Court.  In dealing with sophisti-
cated people, the use of esteem must ordinarily occur naturally or un-
consciously, because flattery is usually easy to see through.242
It is certainly possible to make too much of this, especially for a
district judge who needs no one’s support243 to give a judgment,
render a decree, or author an opinion.  Yet, its relevance to Judge
Weinstein’s effectiveness in many areas, whether it be the acceptance
by others of his innovations, acceptance of his views in extrajudicial
organizations, or his ability to sit jointly with state judges244 cannot be
gainsaid.
“Some people,” Murphy wrote, “are blessed with a warmth and a
sincerity that immediately attract other human beings.”245  He contin-
ued: “It is improbable that even a sophisticated version of a Dale Car-
negie course, whether or not self-taught, could build up anything
approaching the personal magnetism that such people have by na-
238. WEINSTEIN, supra note 50.
239. Linda S. Mullenix, Competing Values: Preserving Litigant Autonomy in an Age of Collec-
tive Redress, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. 601.
240. MURPHY, supra note 3, at 38.
241. Id. at 38–43.
242. It has been argued that it may be a reason for Felix Frankfurter’s inefficacy, because his
attempts to win votes by flattery were seen by many of his colleagues as insincere manipulation.
243. Save that of his staff.
244. See, e.g., 80th Birthday Roundtable, supra note 55, at 199 (New York State Judge Helen
Freedman’s comment).
245. MURPHY, supra note 3, at 49.
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ture.”246  Murphy may have had Chief Justice John Marshall in mind,
or possibly Chief Justice William Howard Taft, but his words are ap-
plicable to the effect Judge Weinstein has on most people.  Loving his
job and possessing a generous view of people, as well as great personal
charm, warmth, and wit, Judge Weinstein is an unusually attractive
personality.
There are many tales of Judge Weinstein’s thoughtfulness and con-
cern for others.  Just one example: During a gale-driven storm that
occurred while he was Chief Judge, he invited demonstrators pro-
testing President Ronald Reagan’s economic policies to spend the
night in the lobby of the United States Courthouse.  He was quoted as
saying: “I don’t know who they are or what they stand for.  I would
have done it for anyone.”247  There are also the thousands of personal
notes Judge Weinstein writes a year, the periodic telephone calls to
friends he hasn’t heard from, and the Christmas visits to each of his
colleagues.  With his extraordinary energy and reading speed, Judge
Weinstein reads a large number of law review articles, and often
writes a warm note to each of the authors.  His letters in support of
candidates for tenure are lengthy and positive.248  Repeating what he
tells his clerks, Judge Weinstein explained, “If we can ever cite an arti-
cle by a friend, we should.  So, if my clerks have ever written anything,
I’d put them in an opinion at one point or another. . . . It’s a sign of
affection.”249
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to describe how an unusually able judge
has used, consciously and unconsciously, the tactics of command, per-
suasion, and esteem to attain influence for his opinions and other
ideas.  Judge Weinstein, naturally attracted to innovations, has at-
tempted to convince others “to move” the law substantively and to
adopt a number of innovations in judicial administration, while also
using his influence to oppose a number of trends in the law.  How
efficacious Judge Weinstein has been is left for evaluation in still an-
other article.  What can be said here, though, is that in an extraordina-
rily rich career in which he has made a variety of important
246. Id.
247. Wolfgang Saxon, Storm Delivers Gust of Winter to New Yorkers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26,
1982, at B3; see also MORRIS, supra note 27, at 65.
248. See, for example, Judge Weinstein’s two-and-one-half page, single-spaced letter to Dean
Jesse Choper reviewing an article by a candidate for tenure, closing “I look forward to reading
much of his first rate materials in future years.”  Letter from Jack B. Weinstein, to Jesse H.
Choper  (Feb. 23, 1986) (on file with author).
249. Weinstein Oral History, supra note 20, at 255.
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contributions, both in deciding cases and in matters affecting the ad-
ministration of justice, Judge Weinstein has made ample use of the
tactics discussed by Walter Murphy.
